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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that a defendant file a petition containing a "short and plain state-
ment of the facts" supporting removal and that the petition be filed
before trial.' 0 Because of the nature of claims arising under sec-
tion 1443(1), the Fifth Circuit decisions create a powerful weapon
for delay of the trial procedure." 0 No matter what the substance
of the allegations may prove to be, petitioner is at least entitled to
a hearing on their merits in the federal district courts. The harass-
ment of local and state prosecutors and the overcrowding of already
burdened federal court dockets are no small price to pay. It is
hoped that some means of strict and speedy scrutiny of removal
petitions may be developed to meet this problem.
.. MALLOY MCKEITHEN
Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina
The common law recognized no right of action for wrongful
death.' Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 created the first statutory
right of action for wrongful death,2 and such rights of action now
... 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964).
... See 43 N.C.L. REV. 628 (1965).
'Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1606). This is the
first case in England where damages for wrongful death were sought in a
civil suit. The plaintiff declared that the defendant had assaulted and beaten
the plaintiff's wife and that she died as a result of her injuries. Recovery
was denied in the action for loss of the deceased's services. "[I]f a man
beats the servant of J. S. so that he dies of the battery and loss of the
service, because of the servant dying of the extremity of the battery, it is
now become an offense to the crown, being converted into a felony, and
that drowns the particular offense, and private wrong offer'd to the master
before, and his action is thereby lost. .. ." 80 Eng. Rep. at 61. See Hoke
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 334, 38 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1946).
The common-law rule made it cheaper to kill than to injure. For ex-
ample, it is said that the reason the first Pullman cars were so constructed
that passengers slept with their heads towards the front of the train was so
they would be killed rather than injured if an accident occurred. It is also
suggested that the fire axes placed in each car were to aid the conductor
in dispatching those passengers only injured. Gamble, Action for Wrozg-
fut Death in Tennessee, 4 VAND. L. REv. 289 (1950).
The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-6.
§ 1. Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such case the person who would have been liable if death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstand-
ing the death of the person injured, and although the death shall
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exist by statute in all fifty states3 and in the territories of the United
States.' Three federal statutes provide for wrongful death recovery
in particular situations,5 and the Warsaw Convention provides for
recovery when the death results from international air travel.6
have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a
felony.
§ 2. Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused,
and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or admin-
istrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury
may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury
resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for
whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so re-
covered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant,
shall be divided amongst the afore-mentioned parties in such shares
as the jury by their verdict shall find and direct.
Lord Campbell's Act has been modified five times since its passage. The
Fatal Accidents Act, 1864, 27 & 28 Vict., c. 95 §§ 1-3 (beneficiaries may
bring the action also); The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 2 (recovery for, or by, illegitimates and
adopteds; recovery for funeral expenses); The Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28, §§ 1-7 (instituted comparative
negligence standard); The Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c.) Act,
1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 36, § 3 (statute of limitations extended to three
years); The Fatal Accidents Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 65, §§ 1-2 (class of
beneficiaries extended; no insurance, gratuity or pension may be considered
in assessing damages).
Lord Campbell's Act was construed in Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q.B.
93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852). "The measure of damages is not the loss or
suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to his
family." 18 Q.B. at 110, 118 Eng. Rep. at 41.
' Statutes will hereinafter be cited only by the name of the state or the
common name of the federal statute. Specific statutory citation can be
found by reference to Appendix A.
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1201 (1961); PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 28, § 1
(1956); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, §§ 310-11 (1955), tit. 31, § 5141 (Supp.
1964) ; V.I. CODE tit. 5, § 76 (1957). These territorial statutes will not be
used in the statistical figures in the article. All statistics in the article are
compiled from the fifty-four jurisdictions listed in Appendix A.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53
Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). The Federal Employers'
Liability Act provides a federal remedy for the injury or death of em-
ployees of railroads engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The Jones
Act, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1964). The Jones Act expressly adopts the same provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, but extends coverage to cases of injury
or death of seamen in the course of their employment. The Death on the
High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (19645. The
Death on the High Seas Act provides a remedy for wrongful death caused
beyond a marine league from the shore of any state, the District of Columbia,
or the territories or dependencies of the United States. See generally BAER,
ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-19 (1963), § 1-9.1 (Supp.
1965).
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000. "The carrier
1966]
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Lord Campbell's Act and its successors in the various jurisdic-
tions generally provide a new cause of action separate from any
action that the decedent might have had if he had lived.7 Three
statutes, however, merely specify that the action of the deceased
will survive rather than create a new cause of action for wrongful
death.' Several states, including North Carolina, give a right of
action under survival statutes for the decedent's injury prior to his
death, and also have a wrongful death statute conferring a right of
action for damages caused by the death itself.9
The majority of the wrongful death statutes are practically the
shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death .. .of a
passenger . . . if the accident ... took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Id. at
ch. III, art. 17. "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and
his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." Id. at ch. III,
art. 20 (1). "If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contrib-
uted to by the negligence of the injured person the court may ... exonerate
the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id. at ch. III, art. 21. "In
the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger
is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs." Id. at ch. III, art. 22(1).
See, e.g., Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801
(N.D. Ga. 1964). This was a suit for wrongful death in the crash of the
tlanta Art Association charter flight from Atlanta to Paris and back.
The court held that the Warsaw Convention superseded any state wrongful
death statute and accordingly limited damages to $8300 under the pro-
visions of the convention.
7 McCoRMciK, DAMAGES § 93 (1935) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK];
PROSSER, TORTS 924 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See, e.g.,
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944); Bolick v. Southern Ry.,
138 N.C. 370, 50 S.E. 689 (1905); Dennick v. Scheiwer, 381 Pa. 200, 113
A.2d 318 (1955); Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Odle's Adm'r, 128
Va. 280, 105 S.E. 107 (1920).
' Connecticut, Louisiana and Tennessee.
'McCoRMIcK § 94. See, e.g., In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 136 S.E.2d
91 (1964); Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d
105 (1946). See generally 25 N.C. L. REv. 84 (1946).
North Carolina's survival statute is typical. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-172,
175 (1950).
§ 28-172. Liability survives to and against representative.-Upon the
death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute
or defend any action or special proceeding, existing in favor of or
against such person, except as hereinafter provided, shall survive to
and against the executor, administrator or collector of his estate.
§ 28-175. Actions which do not survive.-The following rights of
action do not survive:
1. Causes of action for libel and for slander, except of title.
2. Causes of action for false imprisonment and assault and battery.
3. Causes where the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or grant-
ing it would be nugatory, after death.
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same in their basic language and application, but as to the method
of measurement of the damages and distribution of the recovery,
the jurisdictions are split. The action for wrongful death under
current statutes generally can be brought whenever the death of
the decedent is caused by the "wrongful act, neglect or default"'10 of
the defendant. A criminal act of the defendant causing the death
does not affect the action ;1 however, it may provide a basis for
the additional recovery of punitive or exemplary damages.' 2 The
death of the wrongdoer prior to judgment will abate the action
against him for wrongful death in the majority of jurisdictions.'3
If the deceased was compensated for his injury before he died as
a result of it, there is no right of action for the death.'4 A release
by the decedent bars any action for the death also." The reasons
for these rules are that the defendant should not be required to
pay twice for the same wrongful act, and the wording of most
statutes requires that the injured party have a cause of action against
the defendant at the time of his death for a wrongful death action
to lie.'"
There are two generally accepted methods of measuring damages
caused by wrongful death. The measure used by forty-three juris-
dictions is that of loss to the survivors or beneficiaries caused by
the death of the decedent. 17 Six states compute damages according
"The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-6. The great
majority of wrongful death statutes contain this language or a slight varia-
tion. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1960) ("wrongful act, omission, or
negligence"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130[1] (1) (1962) ("negligence or
wrongful act"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1953 (1961) ("wrongful act
or omission"); TEX. REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1) (1952) ("wrongful
act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default").
Concerning wrongful death caused by breach of warranty of fitness, see
generally 30 N.C.L. Rtv. 478 (1952).
" The majority of the wrongful death statutes expressly provide for a
right of action notwithstanding the death was caused by a criminal act. See,
e.g., Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina.
1 See, e.g., Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina and Texas.
"- PRossER 927. Several states have statutory provisions to the effect
that the death of the defendant will not abate the action, however, and that
recovery can be had against his estate. See, e.g., Alabama, California,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Washington.
1'9 N.C.L. Rtv. 101, 102 (1930).
"Ibid. See, e.g., Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335 (1928) ; Edwards v.
Interstate Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 551, 87 S.E. 635 (1916).
"09 N.C.L. REv. 101, 102 (1930).
Alaska, Dralle v. Steele, 13 Alaska 680 (1952); Arizona, Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1961) (no definitive state case on point since the
19663
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to the loss to the estate of the deceased only.18 Of the jurisdictions
using neither of these methods, two states base recovery solely on
the culpability of the defendant in causing the wrongful death;1"
statute was revised); Arkansas, Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d
291 (1959); California, Changaris v. Marvel, 41 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Colorado, Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382
(1953); Florida, Park v. Belford Trucking Co., 165 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Hawaii, Gabriel v. Margah, 37 Hawaii 571 (1947); Idaho,
Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950); Illinois, Barrow
v. Lence, 17 Il1. App. 2d 527, 151 N.E.2d 120 (1958); Indiana, Kirkpatrick
v. Bowyer, 131 Ind. App. 86, 169 N.E.2d 409 (1960); Kansas, Duran v.
Mission Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241 (1953); Louisiana, Parker
v. Smith, 147 So. 2d 414 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Maine, Dostie v. Lewiston
Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393 (1939); Maryland, State
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 207 Md. 91, 113 A.2d 397 (1955); Michigan,
Zolton v. Rotter, 321 Mich. 1, 32 N.W.2d 30 (1948); Minnesota, Fussner
v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Mississippi, Jefferys v.
Clark, 251 Miss. 124, 168 So. 2d 662 (1964); Missouri, Shepard v.
Harris, 329 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1959); Montana, Gilman v. G. W. Dart Hard-
ware Co., 42 Mont. 96, 111 Pac. 550 (1910); Nebraska, Darnell v. Panhandle
Co-op. Ass'n, 175 Neb. 40, 120 N.W.2d 278 (1963); Nevada, Wells, Inc.
v. Shoemake, 64 Nev. 57, 177 P.2d 451 (1947); New Hampshire, Richards
v. Miller No. Broad Transit Co., 96 N.H. 272, 74 A.2d 552 (1950);
New Jersey, Capone v. Norton, 11 N.J. Super. 189, 78 A.2d 126 (App.
Div. 1951); New York, Schreck v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 929, 231 N.Y.S.2d
563 (Ct. Cl. 1962); North Dakota, Henke v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.
1958); Ohio, Danis v. New York Cent. R.R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d
39 (1954); Oklahaina, Cook v. Knox, 273 P.2d 865 (Okla. 1954); Oregon,
Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952); Pennsylvania, Den-
nick v, Scheiwer, 381 Pa. 200, 113 A.2d 318 (1955); South Carolina,
Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950); South Dakota,
Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Texas, Union
Transp., Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Utah, In re
Beam's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950); Vermont, Allen v
Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 Atl. 257 (1938); Virginia, Matthews v. Hicks,
197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); Washington, Gray v. Goodson, 61
Wash. 2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963); West Virginia, Lester v. Rose, 147
W. Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963) ; Wisconsin, Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins.
Co., 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964); Wyoming, Coliseum Motor
Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931); Federal Employers'
Liability Act, Southern Pac. Co. v. Heavingham, 236 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1956); Jones Act, Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937);
Death on the High Seas Act, Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp.
439 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1962); Lord Campbell's
Act, Barnett v. Cohen [1921], 2 K.B. 461.
8 Iowa, Tedrow v. Fort Des Moines Community Servs., Inc., 254 Iowa
193, 117 N.W.2d 62 (1962); Kentucky, Bays v. Cox' Adm'r, 312 Ky. 827,
229 S.W.2d 737 (1950); New Mexico, Mares v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257 (1938); North Carolina, Mendenhall v.
North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898); Rhode Island,
Underwood v. Old Colony St. Ry., 33 R.I. 319, 80 Atl. 390 (1911);
Tennessee, Templeton v. Quarles, 374 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).
"Alabama, Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So. 2d 13 (1942);




one state attempts to measure ,the damages according to the loss to
the decedent himself;20 and two states use a combination of the
loss-to-beneficiaries and loss-to-estate measures.2
Whether the court is using the yardstick of loss to the bene-
ficiaries or of loss to the estate of the decedent in order to determine
the damages, there are elements of consideration in computing the
loss that are common to both methods. Using either measure of
damages the jury will consider the age of the decedent, his health,
habits, occupation, capacity to earn money, and other elements having
a bearing upon his possible financial successes in life.22 Additional
considerations are determined by the measure of damages of each
jurisdiction.
2 Connecticut, Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946)
(compensation for destruction of capacity to carry on life's activities)."Delaware, Kwiatkowski v. Shelihorn & Hill, Inc., 201 A.2d 455 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1964). Where the spouse sues, the damages are loss to the
beneficiary, but if no spouse survives, damages are measured by loss to the
estate. Georgia, Hudson v. Cole, 102 Ga. App. 300, 115 S.E.2d 825 (1960),
GA. CoDn. ANN. § 105-1309. Where the decedent leaves a spouse, parent
or child surviving, the measure of damages is loss to the estate of total
earnings of the decedent with no deductions. If none of these survive the
decedent, the administrator sues for the next of kin, but the measure here
is loss to the beneficiary.
" See, e.g., Dixon v. Serodino, Inc., 331 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1964)
(habits of work and conduct, nonsupport of family and intoxication) ; Tetter-
ton v. Arctic Tankers, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (mental
illness); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Grimes, 99 Ga. App. 774, 109 S.E.2d
890 (1959) (earnings of both decedent and his business); Hudnut v.
Schmidt, 324 Ill. App. 548, 58 N.E.2d 929 (1944) (personal characteristics,
habits of industry and sobriety, mental and physical capacity, age, usual
earnings); Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956)
(earnings of business, age, occupation, health, habits, accumulations, mental
and physical ability); Anderson v. Lavelle, 285 Mich. 194, 280 N.W. 729
(1938) (feeble-mindedness); Shepard v. Harris, 329 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1959)
(good and willing worker, number of jobs held, earnings, tender age);
Zielinski v. Cornwell, 100 N.H. 34, 118 A.2d 734 (1955) (ability, disposition
to work, habits of industry and earning power); Wimberly v. City of
Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (App. Div. 1962) (physical,
mental and moral characteristics, likely earnings); Caudle v. Southern Ry.,
242 N.C. 466, 88 S.E.2d 138 (1955) (age, health, expectancy, earning
capacity, habits, ability and skill, occupation and means for making money);
Quam v. Wengert, 86 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1957) (sobriety, industry, earn-
ings, fixed future wage increases).
In jurisdictions using loss to beneficiaries as the measure of damages,
the life expectancy of the beneficiary is a valid consideration since the
beneficiary is only awarded what he lost by the death. If the beneficiary's
expectancy is less than the decedent's, the damages should be computed on
the shorter expectancy to prevent recovery of more than the beneficiary
would have received if the decedent had not been killed. Francis v. Sauve,
34 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Union Transp., Inc. v. Braun,
318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
1966]
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I. Loss TO THE BENEFICIARIES
Thirty-nine states,23 the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2' the
Jones Act,2 5 the Death on the High Seas Act?" and Lord Campbell's
Act2 7 use the loss-to-beneficiaries measure of damages. The loss
is the present value of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary ad-
vantage from the continuance of the life of the deceased. 8 Within
this rule of recovery, the jurisdictions separate into four groups on
the basis of what they consider to be recoverable loss to the bene-
ficiaries of the action. All of these jurisdictions allow pecuniary
loss to be recovered, but in many cases the problem is determining
what is a pecuniary loss, and what, if any, recovery is to be given
for collateral nonpecuniary losses. The estate the deceased would
have accumulated during the remainder of his expectancy and from
which the beneficiary had expectation of receiving a share by in-
heritance at the decedent's death is an element of pecuniary loss just
as is the loss of contributions that the deceased would have made
to the beneficiary during his lifetime. 9
A. Pecuniary Loss of Financial Contributions Only
Two jurisdictions using the loss-to-beneficiaries measure of
damages limit the recovery to the financial contributions that the
beneficiary had reasonable expectation of receiving from the de-
cedent if he had lived.30 The use of this actual cash measure of
damages can lead to the situation where the deceased may not have
been making any direct monetary contribution, but to replace the
decedent's gratuitous services the beneficiary would have to pay a





" PROSSM 928. See, e.g., Pym v. The Great Northern Ry., 2 B.&S. 759,
121 Eng. Rep. 1254 (1862), aff'd, 4 B.&S. 396, 122 Eng. Rep. 508 (1863).
." Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1960);
Parker v. Smith, 146 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 1962).
" Colorado, Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1953);
Maine, Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393
(1939).
Delaware, when measuring damages by loss to beneficiaries, allows only
pecuniary contributions to be considered. Kwiatkowski v. Shellhorn & Hill,
Inc., 201 A.2d 455 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964). West Virginia limits recovery
to financial loss after the first $10,000 is awarded.
[Vol. 44
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third party, thereby incurring a loss.3 Recovery here would be
small, if anything at all, no matter how valuable the decedent's
services might have been to the beneficiary.
B. Pecuniary Loss Including the Value of the
Decedent's Services
Twelve states," the Federal Employers' Liability Act,33 the
Jones Act," the Death on the High Seas Act33 and Lord Campbell's
Act 6 compute the loss to beneficiaries based upon the pecuniary loss,
including the value of the decedent's services that have a monetary
value. The beneficiary can recover both the pecuniary value of the
decedent's services and the monetary contributions that he has lost
by reason of the death. Compensable damage includes loss of such
services as parental "care, guidance and control," 7 and a mother's
"care and attention to the physical, moral, and educational welfare
of her children, and a husband's loss of her services in the house-
hold."3 There is generally no recovery allowed for the loss of
society, companionship or protection,39 although it is reasonable to
"See Lambert, How Much Is A Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U.L. REv.
328 (1961).
"' California, Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Maryland, State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 207
Md.'91, 113 A.2d 397 (1955); Missouri, Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601
(Mo. App. 1960); Nebraska, Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 194 N.W.
458 (1923); New Hampshire, Richards v. Miller No. Broad Transit Co.,
96 N.H. 272, 74 A.2d 552 (1950); New Jersey, Capone v. Norton, 11 N.J.
Super. 189, 78 A.2d 126 (App. Div. 1950); New York, Finkel v. State, 37
Misc. 2d 757, 237 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Ct. Cl. 1962); North Dakota, Henke v.
Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958); Oklahoma, Cook v. Knox, 273 P.2d
865 (Okla. 1954); Oregon, Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598
(1952); Texas, Union Transp., Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958); Vermont, Butterfield v. Community Light & Power Co., 115
Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415 (1946).
" Brabeck v. Chicago & N.Ry., 264 Minn. 160, 117 N.W.2d 921 (1962).
" Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Va.
1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1964).
" First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), aft'd, 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961).
" Berry v. Humm & Co., [1915], 1 K.B. 627.
"'Finkel v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 757, - , 237 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (Ct. Cl.
1962) (family suffered pecuniarily). See Dahl v. North Am. Creameries,
Inc., 61 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1953) (parental services, nurture, moral and
physical instruction, training and protection).
" Prauss v. Adanski, 195 Ore. 1, 24, 244 P.2d 598, 608 (1952). The
court held that a "pecuniary loss" meant more than the actual earnings or
contributions by the decedent. Compensable loss includes financial assistance
and also the loss of other things that have a monetary worth. "The measure
of damages is the monetary value of such services." Id. at 24, 244 P.2d at 608.
"' First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
19661
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assume that such recovery might be justified in certain situations
where the discontinuance resulted in a pecuniary loss or the service
had an actual pecuniary value." These elements of damage should
obviously be compensable in cases where the services might of neces-
sity have to be replaced by a paid companion, as in a case where
the beneficiary is mentally incompetent or is an invalid.
C. Pecuniary Loss Including Value of Services, Plus Compensation
For "Sentimental Loss"-Consortium, Society, Companionship,
Love and Affection
Seventeen states4 ' allow recovery for the pecuniary loss of con-
1958), aff'd, 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961)
(no recovery for deprivation of society or companionship); Igneri v. Cie.
de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 949 (1963) (no compensation for loss of consortium); Capone v.
Norton, 11 N.J. Super. 189, 78 A.2d 126 (1950) (no compensation for loss
of society and companionship); Crossett v. Andrews, 277 P.2d 117 (Okla.
1954) (no damages for loss of society); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Hamil-
ton, 314 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (no recovery for loss of
society or companionship).
40 California has allowed recovery for loss of comfort, protection and
society to children for the killing of a seventy-eight-year-old patriarch of
an extremely close and devoted family. The loss here was held to have
actual value. Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal. App. 2d 925,
200 P.2d 98 (1948) (comfort, society and protection are pecuniary loss).
Nebraska upheld an instruction allowing the jury in an automobile acci-
dent death case to consider the husband's "loss of services and companion-
ship .. . in so far as they have a monetary value." This recovery for
deprivation of companionship is limited to special circumstances. Ensor v.
Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 523, 194 N.W. 458, 459 (1923).
See generally 39 N.D.L. REv. 198, 201 (1963).
" Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.340 (1962) (expressly allowed by
statute, but no cases on this point have been located); Arizona, Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1961) (no state case on point since the statute was
revised); Hawaii, Gabriel v. Margah, 37 Hawaii 571 (1947); Idaho, Hepp
v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942); Illinois, Hall v. Gillins, 13
Ill. App. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); Indiana, New York Cent. R.R. v.
Wyatt, 184 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. App. 1962); Michigan, Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361
Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Minnesota, Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn.
347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Mississippi, Boroughs v. Oliver, 226 Miss.
609, 85 So. 2d 191 (1956); Montana, Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel.
Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 Pac. 971 (1909); Nevada, Porter v. Funkhouser,
79 Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216 (1963); Ohio, Mann v. Hirzel Canning Co.,
137 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio App. 1955); Pennsylvania, Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-
Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959) ; Utah, Beaman
v. Martha Washington Mining Co., 23 Utah 139, 63 Pac. 631 (1901);
Washington, Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963);
Wisconsin, Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d




tributions and services resulting from the death and award compen-
sation for intangible losses not necessarily of a pecuniary nature.
The courts of these jurisdictions perform the virtually impossible
task of determining the amount of monetary damages suffered as
a result of the loss of "love and affection,"42 "marital relations,"43
and "society."44 These losses are indisputably tragic and, in most
cases, real, but fixing their pecuniary worth would appear to be
sheer speculation on the part of a jury. There is no real basis from
which to proceed in computing damages for these losses. In the
area of nonfatal personal injury, speculative damages are extremely
difficult to recover.45 The "vase of happiness" does not exhibit a
readily discernible price tag.
46
D. Pecuniary Loss Including Value of Services and "Sentimental
Loss," Plus Compensation For the Mental Anguish and
Grief of the Beneficiaries
Eight states47 allow a beneficiary to recover for mental suffer-
ing, anguish or grief caused by the wrongful death in addition to
damages for pecuniary and sentimental losses. Arkansas 4 and
Florida expressly provide for this recovery by statute, although the
"' McFarland v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 241 La. 15, 27, 127 So. 2d 183,
187 (1961).
"Park v. Belford Trucking Co., 165 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
" Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 466, 220 P.2d 682, 683 (1950).
In Capone v. Norton, 11 N.J. Super. 189, 78 A.2d 126 (1950), the court
stated that deprivation of affection, sentiment, society and companionship
are excluded from consideration as elements of damage as they are incapable
of being defined by any recognized measure.
" Cf. Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28
(1938). The court denied recovery for loss of the enjoyment of playing a
violin resulting from injury to plaintiff's hand because the amount of damage
was too speculative.
"' Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153
A.2d 490 (1959). The court's "vase" was composed of companionship,
comfort, society, guidance, solace and protection. The award for the loss
of these elements caused by the death of a thirty-six-year-old woman was
$46,059.54.
"'Arkansas, Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959);
Florida, Steele v. Miami Transit Co., 160 Fla. 362, 34 So. 2d 530 (1948);
Kansas, Duran v. Mission Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241 (1953);
Louisiana, Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So. 748 (La. App. 1936); South Carolina,
Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950); South Dakota,
Simmons v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950); Virginia, Matthews
v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); West Virginia, Lester v.
Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963).
" Recovery is limited to immediate family and those in loco parentis.
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Florida act only operates to compensate parents for their anguish
caused by the death of their child.49 Mental anguish is the most
liberal element of damage recoverable in a wrongful death action
and is almost entirely speculative. The only instance in which the
jury would be restrained in awarding compensation for mental an-
guish or grief would be in a case that showed on its face that this
element of damage was not present to any substantial degree.50
II. Loss TO THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT
Loss to the estate of the deceased is the measure of damages
used by six states including North Carolina.51 The recovery is not
based upon any loss the beneficiaries or survivors of the deceased
might have sustained as a result of his death, but solely on the
pecuniary loss caused to the deceased's estate by his death. 2 The
states employing the loss-to-estate measure use one of three rules
in determining the amount of the damages.
A. Present Worth of the Probable Life Savings of the Deceased
The measure of recovery used by Iowa5" and Rhode Island54 is
that of the probable accumulations that the deceased would have
earned and saved by his own efforts if he had not been killed. All
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1964).
BoBeaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E. D.
Ark. 1959); Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961). There
is no recovery allowed for mental anguish which consists simply of annoy-
ance, disappointment or a mental suffering growing out of an imaginary
situation. 18 ARK. L. REv. 161 (1964) states that the test applied by Arkansas
is that of "more than normal grief" with varying proof required according
to the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 165. The mental anguish
must be real. See generally 22 Am. JuR. 2D Damages § 195 (1965).
Recovery for mental anguish inevitably opens the door to extremely high
verdicts. See, e.g., Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792
(D.D.C. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (recovery of $17,000
in the death of a newborn child who died as a result of a fall through a
hole in the delivery table).
" Iowa, Tedrow v. Fort Des Moines Community Servs., Inc., 254 Iowa
193, 117 N.W.2d 62 (1962); Kentucky, Bays v. Cox' Adm'r, 312 Ky. 827,
229 S.W.2d 737 (1950); New Mexico, Mares v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257 (1938) ; North Carolina, Mendenhall v. North
Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898); Rhode Island, Under-
wood v. Old Colony St. Ry., 33 R.I. 319, 80 Atl. 390 (1911); Tennessee,
Templeton v. Quarles, 374 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).
' McComicic § 95.
" 8Tedrow v. Fort Des Moines Community Servs., Inc., 254 Iowa 193,
117 N.W.2d 62 (1962).
" Underwood v. Old Colony St. Ry., 33 R.I. 319, 80 Atl. 390 (1911).
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expenses, personal and family, or for any other purpose, are deducted
in fixing the recovery at the probable life savings of the decedent. 5
This recovery does not include probable accumulations which would
yield some benefit without the effort, skill or capacity of the deceased,
such as property or capital that do not require effort to enhance
their value. 6
B. Aggregate of the Probable Gross Earnings of the Deceased
During His Expectancy
Kentucky5 7 bases recovery for wrongful death on the amount
of the probable gross earnings of the deceased for the remainder
of his life reduced to its present value, without deductions for any
expenses whatever.
C. Present Net Pecuniary Worth of the Life of the Deceased
New Mexico," North Carolina59 and Tennessee 0 measure dam-
ages according to the present net worth of the deceased's life. This
rule is only concerned with the probable gross earnings of the de-
ceased for the remainder of his life if he had not been killed, minus
his personal expenses. 1 In addition to other elements, age and
manner of living are considered by the jury in ascertaining prob-
able personal expenses62 to determine future earnings of the de-
ceased.
63
" See notes 53 and 54 supra.
"' MCCORMICK § 96. The North Carolina court in Carter v. North
Carolina R.R., 139 N.C. 499, 501, 52 S.E. 642, 643 (1905), attacked the
probable life savings measure of damages stating that nine-tenths of the
people would be beyond the protection of the lav because few men ever
accumulate estates. The earnings of the majority were said to be spent on
their families rather than saved. By this measure the family of a miser
would benefit while the beneficiaries of a generous man who provided for
their needs with his earnings would get nothing.
Rhode Island has also used the net-pecuniary-worth-of-the-decedent's-life
measure, which has not yet been expressly overruled. McCabe v. Narragan-
sett Elec. Lighting Co., 26 R.I. 427, 59 Atl. 112 (1904).
"Lexington Util. Co. v. Parker's Adm'r, 166 Ky. 81, 178 S.W. 1173
(1915). See Bays v. Cox' Adm'r, 312 Ky. 827, 229 S.W.2d 737 (1950)
(destruction of power to earn money).
" Mares v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257 (1938).
" Mendenhall v. North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898).
60 Templeton v. Quarles, 374 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963). See
generally 4 VAND. L. REv. 289 (1950).
"1 McCoRMtICx § 96; 28 N.C.L. Rav. 106, 107 (1949). See 3 N.C.L. Rav.
98 (1925), on the refusal of the North Carolina court to allow recovery for
loss of consortium in a negligent death action.
8 Carter v. North Carolina R.R., 139 N.C. 499, 52 S.E. 642 (1905).
e See note 22 supra.
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Whether the loss-to-beneficiaries or loss-to-estate measure is
used by the jurisdiction, generally no recovery will be given for
substantial damages if there is no loss proved.' The damages re-
covered are normally reduced to their present value.65 The great
majority of jurisdictions hold that insurance benefits paid because
of the death 6 or the remarriage of the surviving spouse67 are not
elements to be considered by the jury in computing damages.
III. DirFICULT DECEDENTS
There are three classes of decedents for whose deaths a recovery
is difficult or impossible to measure or obtain, depending on the
measure of damages used. They are (1) minor children, (2) the
elderly or handicapped, and (3) a wife and/or mother.
A. Minor Children
The loss-to-estate measure of damages requires that a jury, with
a minimum of information because of the extremely short life of
the decedent, determine the lifetime earnings of a deceased child
who was no more than a babe-in-arms at the time of death."8 The
" See, e.g., Boller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 185 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind.
1960); Armstrong v. Berk, 96 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Changeris
v. Marvel, 231 A.C.A. 345, 41 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
Graul v. Adrian, 49 IIl. App. 2d 101, 199 N.E.2d 631 (1964); Gilman v.
G. W. Dart Hardware Co., 42 Mont. 96, 11 Pac. 550 (1910); Armentrout
v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958). Contra, Hogsett v. Hanna,
41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540 (1936); Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d
859 (1942); Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C. 364, 120 S.E.2d 209 (1961);
Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963).
", McCORMICK §§ 86, 96. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-47 (Supp. 1965)
(discount table); Mares v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Co., 42 N.M. 473,
82 P.2d 257 (1938) (discussion of discounting awards).
"2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTS § 25.22 (1956). An insurance recovery
under a policy taken out and paid for by the employer for the deceased
is deducted from the damages. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson,
295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989, 370 U.S. 937 (1961).
87 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244
P,2d 598 (1952). Only three jurisdictions have held remarriage to be a
proper element of consideration for the jury. Sipes v. Michigan Cent. R.R.,
231 Mich. 404, 204 N.W. 84 (1925); Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co.,
23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964); Lory v. Great Western Ry.,
[1941] 1 All E.R. 230 (K.B.).
"Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900)
($1,000 for the death of a five-month-old infant). For a discussion of the
problem of prenatal injury causing death, see Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303,
204 A.2d 140 (1964); Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for
Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 61 (1960); Note, The Inpact of




speculative nature of such a determination can hardly be questioned.
The jurisdictions employing the measure of loss to beneficiaries,
regardless of what are considered to be elements of damage, have
a somewhat less difficult task. The jury here only has to attempt to
determine the amount, if any, of the reasonable expectancy of
pecuniary advantage from the continued life of the deceased. 9 If
the plaintiff does not prove any reasonable expectancy, there is no
recovery. 70 This is more definite than the job of a jury using the
loss-to-estate measure, which must determine the earnings as well
as the personal expenditures of the deceased infant for the re-
mainder of his life, based only on testimony of the child's age,
health, size and appearance.71 Reaching into the future as far as
seventy years"2 for the earnings and expenses of an infant is hardly
a realistic gauge of the loss caused by the death.
Various states have attempted to provide for facilitation of re-
covery in the case of death of a child through special statutory
provisions and judicial construction of existing statutes. Eleven
state statutes contain provisions for the parent of the deceased child
to maintain the action for wrongful death rather than the executor
or administrator,"7 and one state specifies only parents can recover
damages for mental anguish."4 Wycko v. Gnodtke75 a 1960 Mich-
" See, e.g., Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1964); Gilman v. G. W. Dart Hardware Co., 42 Mont. 96, 11 Pac.
550 (1910) ; Devine v. Southern Pac. Co., 207 Ore. 261, 295 P.2d 201 (1956).
70 See, e.g., Barnett v. Cohen, [1921], 2 K.B. 461 (no reasonable expecta-
tion of benefit found).
"1 See, e.g., Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 964, 36
S.E. 191, 191 (1900) (sex, age and health of five-month-old child). In
Bumgardner v. Allison, 238 N.C. 621, 626, 78 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1953), the
court awarded $25,000 for the killing of an eleven-year-old girl on testimony
showing that the decedent had been "strong, healthy" and "of more than
average ability." An award of $35,000 was upheld in Cronenberg v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 701 (E.D.N.C. 1954), although the only evidence
of the decedent's gross earning capacity and lifetime expenses was testimony
concerning the qualities of the decedent's mind, body and personality.
2 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1965). North Carolina's statutory
mortality table is typical and provides computations from ages 0 to 104
years. The majority of jurisdictions hold that mortality tables are only
some evidence to be considered and are not conclusive on the issue of life
expectancy. See, e.g., Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.
N.Y. 1962); Shaw v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 170 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1965);
Eisenhower v. Jeter, 205 Va. 159, 135 S.E.2d 786 (1964).
78 California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington.
Florida.
70361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). See 46 IOWA L. REv. 944
(1961); 31 U. Cic. L. Rsv. 127 (1962); 38 U. DET. L.J. 227 (1960).
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igan decision, overturned the previous measure of damages in the
death of a minor, which had been earnings during minority less the
cost of the child's support. The court instituted a "pecuniary value
of life" measure based on the loss to the parent of the child's com-
panionship and the loss of investment in raising the child until his
death.76 Michigan was the first of the jurisdictions using the "child
labor theory" to abandon it judicially.17 Minnesota followed the lead
of Wycko and in 1961 judicially reconstructed its wrongful death
act as applied to children.
7 8
There is questionable logic in making special rules for recovery
in the case of a child's death since any rule would necessarily be
based on a child's age and status. Thus, with the passing of time
or the emancipation of the child, the rule would automatically change,
making the measure of damages different from one day to another.
79
The majority of jurisdictions, including North Carolina, use the
same measure of damages for both children and adults.8" Loss to
the estate is an especially difficult and speculative measure when
applied to the death of a minor, but if the loss-to-beneficiaries mea-
sure is the test, the same standard can be applied in cases of decedents
of all ages with a minimum of the speculation attached to fixing of
death damages. The only question for the jury would be that of
"reasonable expectation."'"
"' Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 338, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960).
Michigan measures damages by the loss to beneficiaries. See Note 41 supra.
Loss of investment to the parent resulting from a child's death may appear
sound at first blush, but it is not logical. If a pianist's hands were amputated
in an accident he would not attempt to recover the cost of his music lessons
or the value of the time that he had spent practicing the piano.
" 46 IowA L. REv. 944, 947 (1961). Using the child labor theory, damages
for the death of a child are computed by subtracting the cost of the child's
maintenance from the amount he would probably have earned during his
minority.
' Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961) (monetary
value of parent's loss of comfort, society or companionship). See generally
Lambert, Wrongful Death of a Child, 30 NACCA L.J. 188 (1964) ($14,747
average award for a minor's death); 39 N.D.L. REv. 198 (1963).
"' This would be the inevitable result of maintaining two standards of
measurement that would necessarily shift from a child's standard to that of
an adult when a child attained a specified age or became emancipated.
80 Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 967, 36 S.E. 191,
192 (1900) ; PROSSER 961.
"Presley v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 153 So. 2d 416, 420 (La. App.
1963); McCoRMICK § 99 ("might reasonably have expected to receive");
PRossER 931 ("might have expected to receive").
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B. The Elderly or Handicapped
An area of less litigation, but no fewer problems, is that of
the elderly or handicapped decedent. In a jurisdiction using loss
to the estate as a measure, or where loss to beneficiaries is used
but limited to financial contributions, there is no chance of recovery
when it is shown that the decedent would not have been capable of
earning money beyond the cost of his own support during the re-
mainder of his expectancy.8 2 A court allowing recovery of non-
pecuniary losses and damages for mental anguish would be able to
award some compensation, though it would be speculative.83 The
logical measure would be one allowing recovery of the pecuniary
value of the decedent's services that were lost to the beneficiaries.
This element of damages would provide a yardstick for the worth
of the deceased to the beneficiaries and would allow a just recovery
for the death of those who do not have any expectation of earning
wages, but who confer benefit through some service having a mone-
tary value, however small.
84
C. Wife and/or Mother
The problem of recovery in the death of a wife and/or mother
is confined to the jurisdictions using the loss-to-estate measure and
"' The North Carolina court in Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142
S.E.2d 585 (1965), held that the lower court erred in denying a nonsuit
in an action for the death of a mentally retarded child who would have
been a dependent person incapable of earning a livelihood all of his life.
See Schreck v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 929, 231 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1962)
where an action was brought for the negligent deaths of epileptics in a
state institution. The court allowed only funeral expenses to be recovered
by the beneficiaries since the decedents were so handicapped by epilepsy
that there was little or no chance that they would ever leave the institution
and resume a normal place in society. The beneficiaries of the one boy
who had a good chance to assume a normal role in life were awarded $10,000.
In Jefferson v. Joiner, 75 Nev. 207, 337 P.2d 622 (1959), only nominal
damages were allowed for the death of an insane man where there was no
showing that he would ever return to a normal condition. In Armentrout v.
Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1957), the plaintiff could not show
any earning power of the eighty-year-old female decedent. The court upheld
a verdict for the defendant, and taxing of costs to the plaintiff, refusing to
grant nominal or punitive damages even though the defendant had admitted
the felonious killing. In Parsons v. Easton, 184 Cal. 764, 195 Pac. 419
(1921), the court reversed as excessive a $6,000 recovery for the death of
a crippled and mentally deficient decedent.
" See generally notes 41 & 47 supra.
" See generally Pierce v. Mowry, 105 N.H. 428, 201 A.2d 901 (1964).
The court stated that although the decedent was crippled and probably would
never have earned any money that this did not preclude the jury from con-
sidering the decedent's capacity to earn money. This required the consider-
ation of the value of the decedent's services,
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those that use the loss-to-beneficiaries measure without allowing the
value of the decedent's services to be considered as an element of
damages. Using the loss-to-estate measure, the North Carolina
court awarded only 4,000 dollars damages for the death of an
educated thirty-three-year-old wife and mother of two children. 5
The jury was to determine only the probable future earnings of
the decedent. 8 The result is necessarily the same in jurisdictions
where the damages are calculated by loss to beneficiaries with no
recovery for any loss beyond actual financial contributions. a7 Pecu-
niary benefit can come in other forms than specie, and anyone would
feel enriched financially if he acquired free maid service, baby sit-
ting, and moral, educational and physical training for his children,
plus an interested manager to care for the household and its mem-
bers, all on an around-the-clock basis. Would a person not suffer
a real pecuniary loss if these gratuitous, but necessary, services were
taken from him?
It has been computed that the cost of duplicating just the labor
of a housewife thirty-six years of age with one six-year-old child
and a thirty-seven-year-old husband would be 228,109 dollars in
present net worth."8 A United States district court has determined
the loss caused by the death of a wife and mother of six children
at 125,100 dollars, 9 and a Mississippi court awarded damages in
the amount of 307,060 dollars for the death of a thirty-four-year-old
mother of eight children. 0° The loss-to-beneficiaries measure of
Be Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
' Id. at 732, 71 S.E.2d at 52.
', See note 30 supra.
Be Lassiter, Estimating the Monetary Value of Damages lit Negligence
Cases Involving Death, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 384, 392 (1962) (an economist's
approach to death damage computation).
Be Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961). The
court relied upon the decision in Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla.
1954), where $100,000 was awarded for the death of a wife after evidence
showed that it would cost $250 per month plus maintenance to hire a substi-
tute to care for the decedent's family.
B0 Lambert, How Much Is a Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U.L. REv. 328,
334 (1961). See Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958),
aff'd sub nom., 261 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1958). The court awarded the hus-
band of the fifty-five-year-old decedent $68,100 for the present value of her
services to the husband in his business, and $12,200 was awarded as the value
of her earnings. In discussing the actual value of companionship of a
spouse, the court stated: "This companionship is the elixir of life to the
youth and middle-aged, but it is the necessity of life, as oxygen is to the
air, to those who are treading the pathway of life in the later years of
one's existence on earth." Id. at 279. In Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v.
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damages allowing recovery for the value of services is the most
equitable, and only logical, method of determining damages from
the death of a wife and/or mother. Some courts go beyond pecuni-
ary loss in allowing intangible damages to be recovered,9" but this
approaches speculation, and it would seem sufficient to limit damages
to contributions plus the value of services that require payment of
third persons to replace.
92
IV, ELEMENTS OF RECOVERY
The recovery of expenses for the medical, hospital, funeral and
burial services stemming from the wrongful death varies with the
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions that allow recovery for medical and
hospital costs do so under either a survival statute or a wrongful
death statute.9 3 Costs of the funeral cannot be recovered in a sur-
vival action since the decedent would not have had an action for
burial costs if he had lived.9" Eighteen jurisdictions"5 allow re-
covery under their wrongful death statutes for both medical and
funeral expenses. Twelve jurisdictions9" grant recovery for the
Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), there was a $100,000
recovery for the death of a wife and mother of two children.
"' See notes 41 & 47 supra.
" See, e.g., Berry v. Humm & Co., [1915] 1 K.B. 627.
" See note 9 supra. See also, e.g., Langford v. Ritz Taxicab Co., 172
Neb. 153, 109 N.W.2d 120 (1961); Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369
S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963); Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364
P.2d 1102 (1961).
"Survival statutes only transfer a right of action that the decedent
would have had if he had lived. See note 9 supra.
"Alaska, Dralle v. Steele, 13 Alaska 680 (1952); Georgia, Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 104 S.E.2d 208 (1958); Hawaii,
see Appendix A; Indiana, Kirkpatrick v. Bowyer, 131 Ind. App. 86, 169
N.E.2d 409 (1960); Kansas, see Appendix A; Louisiana, McFarland v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 241 La. 15, 127 So. 2d 183 (1961); Maine, see Appendix
A; Michigan, Baker v. Slack, 30 N.W.2d 403, 319 Mich. 703 (1948);
Missouri, Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App. 1960); Montana,
Hennessey v. Burlington Transp. Co., 103 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1950)
(no state case found on point); Nevada, Williams v. McDaniel, 119 F. Supp.
247 (D. Nev. 1953) (no state case found on point); New Hampshire, Cote
v. Martel, 103 N.H. 110, 165 A.2d 590 (1960); New York, Lawrence v.
State, 44 Misc. 2d 756, 255 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Oklahoma,
Crossett v. Andrews, 277 P.2d 117 (Okla. 1955); Oregon, Hansen v. Hayes,
175 Ore. 358, 154 P.2d 202 (1944); Pennsylvania, see Appendix A;
Tennessee, Templeton v. Quarles, 374 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963),
Potts v. Leigh, 15 Tenn. App. 1 (1931); West Virginia, Stamper v. Bannis-
ter, 146 W. Va. 100, 118 S.E.2d 313 (1961).
" Arkansas, Bockman v. Butler, 226 Ark. 159, 288 S.W.2d 597 (1956);
California, Francis v. Sauve, 34 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Colorado, Espinoza v. Gurule, 144 Colo. 381, 356 P2d 891 (1960); Dela-
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
funeral expenses alone, with the majority requiring that the bene-
ficiary must have either paid for the funeral or incurred the debt for
it." The theory for allowing recovery here is that the funeral is a
pecuniary loss to the beneficiary. 8 Iowa does not allow the recovery
of funeral expenses because this is an expense that inevitably would
have been incurred, but does allow recovery of interest for the pre-
mature cost of the service for the period of the decedent's life
expectancy." The North Carolina wrongful death act provides that
the recovery of the decedent's net pecuniary worth is subject to
the payment of hospital, medical and burial expenses up to 500
dollars, subject to approval by the clerk of superior court.'00
The three federal statutes' l ' do not provide for the recovery of
funeral costs, but the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the
Jones Act have survival provisions under which the medical and
hospital costs can be recovered.
The conscious pain and suffering of the deceased in the interval
between injury and death is generally recovered under survival
statutes,0 2 but this compensation can be recovered in an action under
the wrongful death statutes of nine jurisdictions. 03 To be com-
pensable under either the wrongful death statutes or the survival
ware, Reynolds v. Willis, - Del. - , 209 A.2d 760 (1965); Florida,
Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (no state case
found on this point); North Dakota, Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, 215
N.W. 83 (1927); South Carolina, Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62
S.E.2d 297 (1950); Utah, Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772
(1943); Wisconsin, Rossow v. Lathrop, 20 Wis. 2d 658, 123 N.W.2d 305
(1963); Wyoming, see Appendix A; Lord Campbell's Act, The Law Re-
form (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 2 (3).
0" See, e.g., Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, 215 N.W. 83 (1927);
Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1952).
"' McCoRMICx § 102. See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 485, 535. At least one state
has allowed the parents of beneficiaries of the deceased to recover out-of-
pocket damages for costs of the medical, hospital and funeral expenses that
were not recoverable under the wrongful death statute. Graul v. Adrian,
49 Ill. App. 101, 199 N.E.2d 631 (1964), aff'd, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d
444 (1965).
00 Brady v. Haw, 187 Iowa 501, 174 N.W. 331 (1919).
.00 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965).
"'Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act, Death on the High Seas
Act.
102 See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Rosenthal v. O'Neal, 108 Ga. App. 54, 132 S.E.2d 150 (1963); Rohlfing v.
Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1961); Bruck v. Meatto
Trucking Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 521, 245 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1963); Jenkins v.
Hennigan, 298 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Orcutt v. Spokane
County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act.
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statutes, the pain and suffering of the decedent must be conscious 0
and must be more than that pain merely incident to the killing.10 5
Exemplary or punitive damages have been allowed in at least
fourteen states.0 6 The prerequisite for recovery of punitive dam-
ages where they are allowed in addition to compensatory damages
is a willful act or gross negligence.3° 7 The majority of jurisdic-
tions do not award punitive damages since the wrongful death action
had its beginning as a compensatory act to give a remedy for the
injury to the beneficiaries of the deceased.' 8 There is no logical
reason for awarding punitive damages not based on any loss to
beneficiaries of the deceased. Any punishment necessary for a
wrongful killing can be meted out in the criminal courts.
Six states 09 and the Death on the High Seas Act have given
prejudgment interest on wrongful death damages."0 In the juris-
'oSee, e.g., Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 243
(1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1964); Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studios,
137 Neb. 289, 289 N.W. 341 (1939) ; S.H. Kress & Co. v. Nash, 183 Okla.
544, 83 P.2d 536 (1938).
"'5 St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1914). See Reed
v. Eubanks, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132 (1957) (no recovery for pain
when there is no period of suffering before death).
'xo Alabama and Massachusetts allow only punitive damages. Parker v.
Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So. 2d 13 (1942); Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956). Of the twelve other states
allowing recovery of punitive damages, four expressly provide for this re-
covery by statute. Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas.
Arkansas, Mode v. Barnett, 235 Ark. 641, 361 S.W.2d 525 (1962);
Connecticut, Broughel v. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 73 Conn. 614, 48
Atl. 751 (1901); Mississippi, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Fuller, 106 Miss. 65, 63
So. 265 (1913); Montana, Olsen v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 35 Mont.
400, 89 Pac. 731 (1907); South Dakota, Moberg v. Scott, 42 S.D. 372, 175
N.W. 559 (1919); Tennessee, Union Ry. v. Carter, 129 Tenn. 459, 166 S.W.
592 (1914); Virginia, Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r, 29 Grat. (70 Va.)
570 (1877); West Virginia, Turner v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 40 W.Va. 675,
22 S.E. 83 (1895).
"O MCCORMICK §§ 79 & 103.
108 Id. at § 103. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1864, 27 & 28 Vict., c. 95, §§
1-3 is entitled, "An Act to amend the Act Ninth and Tenth Victoria, Chapter
Ninety-three, for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accident."
North Carolina does not allow punitive damages. Hines v. Frink, 257
N.C. 723, 127 S.E.2d 509 (1962).
... New Jersey, Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 254 F.2d
132 (2d Cir. 1958) (no state case found on this point); Colorado, Seward
v. York, 124 Colo. 512, 239 P.2d 301 (1951); Iowa, Sisson v. Weatherman,
252 Iowa 786, 108 N.W.2d 585 (1961); Massachusetts, Nugent v. Boston
Consol. Gas Co., 238 Mass. 221, 130 N.E. 488 (1921); Michigan, Larsen v.
Home Tel. Co., 164 Mich. 295, 129 N.W. 894 (1911); New Hampshire,
Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230 (1959).
". National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 885 (1959).
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dictions where this question has been expressly treated, it is usually
important whether the instruction to the jury asked for a determina-
tion of the damages as of the time of the death or as of the time of
trial."'
V. PARTY AUTHORIZED TO BRING THE ACTION
Of the acts of the fifty states, the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act and Lord
Campbell's Act, only the statutes of Iowa and Maryland do not
expressly designate the party who is to bring the action for wrong-
ful death. Thirty-one jurisdictions, including North Carolina,
specify that only the personal representative, executor or administra-
tor can bring the action." 2 Other jurisdictions list combinations of
the spouse and personal representative," 3 the heirs and personal
representative," 4 and the persons entitled to recover under the
act."" The use of time periods by which the right to sue extends
to an increasing number of persons if suit is not promptly instituted
is incorporated into several statutes." 6
VI. BENEFICIARIES
A. Parties Receiving Recovery
Regardless of the measure used to determine the amount of
damages, the persons who actually receive the money do so accord-
ing to the distribution provided for in the wrongful death statutes.
The actual recovery in a jurisdiction using the loss-to-estate mea-
sure of damages is generally specified by the wrongful death statute
as not subject to the debts of the deceased"' and is stated to be
"for the exclusive benefit of" the beneficiaries under the statutes
. See, e.g., id. Interest was allowed where damages were computed as
of the date of death rather than the date of trial. Sisson v. Weatherman,
252 Iowa 786, 108 N.W.2d 585 (1961), stated that interest would be allowed
if the jury was not instructed to compute it.
... Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon (parent may sue for a
child's death), Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Washington (parent may sue for child's death), West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act, Death
on the High Seas Act, Lord Campbell's Act.
"" See, e.g., Arizona, Delaware, Tennessee.
... See, e.g., California, North Dakota, Pennsylvania.
"' See, e.g., Florida, Hawaii, Kansas.
... See, e.g., Colorado, Missouri, North Dakota.
1' See, e.g., Iowa, North Carolina.
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measuring damages by the loss to beneficiaries." 8 Twenty-seven of
the fifty-four jurisdictions have exclusive classes of beneficiaries., 9
Six states, including North Carolina, provide for the intestate suc-
cession law or the statute of distributions of the state to determine
the beneficiaries of the recovery.120 Forty-one jurisdictions expressly
provide for recovery by the surviving spouse,121 although only five
make this recovery exclusive of all other surviving parties.
122
Twenty-seven statutes provide expressly for recovery by the surviv-
ing spouse and any children, 2 3 with fourteen of these statutes
making this an exclusive class.' 24 Six states have statutes requiring
that the recovery go to the spouse and next of kin.1 5 Nine juris-
dictions place the parent of the deceased on the same level of re-
covery with the spouse or children, 126 with seven statutes only set-
ting up one general class of "heirs" to recover. 27  One statute
specifies that the estate of the deceased is to receive the recovery.
128
Only three statutes provide for the recovery of damages by a non-
related dependent of the deceased. 29 The use of succession statutes
118 See, e.g., Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Death on the High Seas Act.
.Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,
Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act.
"'Alabama, Iowa, New Jersey, North Carolina, West Virginia,
Wyoming.
... Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Federal Employers' Liability
Act, Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act, Lord Campbell's Act..2 Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico.
"'Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Tex-
as, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Federal Employers' Liability Act,
Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act, Lord Campbell's Act.
"'Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington,
Wisconsin, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act..2. Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Vermont.
.12 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Death on the High Seas Act, Lord Campbell's Act..2 Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Utah, West Virginia,
Wyoming.
128 Connecticut.
12 Alaska, Florida, Hawaii.
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and exclusive classes of beneficiaries in determining the persons
eligible to receive compensation is not in line with a purpose of
compensating those damaged by the death, regardless of the mea-
sure used in computing the amount of damages. Under the majority
of the statutes, a dependent relative outside the specified class of
exclusive beneficiaries 180 or a nonrelated dependent' 3 ' has no means
of receiving compensation no matter how great his pecuniary loss.
B. Apportionment of Recovery
The apportionment of the damages to the distributees is expressly
provided for by the wrongful death statutes of forty-nine of the
fifty-four jurisdictions. 32 Fourteen of these statutes require the
jury, if there is one, to apportion the damages among the bene-
ficiaries.' 31 The judge distributes the recovery in eight jurisdic-
tions.3 4 Thirteen states apportion according to intestate distribution
statutes,8" and eleven states apportion pursuant to provisions in
the wrongful death statutes themselves." 6 The judge apportions
subject to the wrongful death statute provisions in three jurisdic-
tions.'8 7 Of the six states using the loss-to-estate measure, four
distribute damages recovered according to the provisions of the
wrongful death statutes,8 s and the other two follow intestate suc-
cession laws.'13  In a jurisdiction using loss to beneficiaries as the
measure of damages, it seems illogical to apportion damages by
any other means than a jury, if there is one, since the jury that
determines the amount of damages according to the loss to the
beneficiaries is best qualified to distribute this recovery among the
individual beneficiaries.
... See notes 119, 120, 122, 124, & 125 supra.
1" See note 129 supra.
... Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, and Utah are the five jurisdic-
tions that do not provide expressly for apportionment of damages.
"'Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Jones Act,
Lord Campbell's Act.
... California, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Death on the High Seas Act.
... Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia,
Wyoming.
"'C Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee.... New York, Vermont, Wisconsin.
1.8 Kentucky, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee.
100 Iowa, North Carolina.
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C. Death of a Beneficiary
The death of a beneficiary of a wrongful death action before
judgment will not abate the action in those states using loss to the
estate as the measure of damages, since the existence of beneficiaries
is not material to the action. 4 In the majority of jurisdictions
where damages are measured by loss to beneficiaries, the action
abates only where the dying beneficiary is the last or sole surviving
beneficiary qualifying to receive compensation for the wrongful
death.' Even then, the estate of the deceased beneficiary may be
able to recover the damages suffered by the beneficiary from the
time of the decedent's death until the death of the beneficiary.' 42
The statutes of a few states provide that the right of action vests
in the estate of the decedent where there are no beneficiaries.
143
VII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Contributory negligence of the decedent defeats recovery in ac-
tions for wrongful death in most jurisdictions.'44 The statutes of
thirty-two of the fifty-four jurisdictions contain language limiting
the right of recovery to cases in which the decedent could have
recovered for his injuries if he had lived. 45 Generally, this language
imposes the bar of contributory negligence to the action,'46 but in
the jurisdictions where the standard of comparative negligence is
used in personal injury actions, the damages would only be dimin-
',
0 The North Carolina court has held that when an action is brought
under the wrongful death statute and there is no surviving beneficiary
entitled to recover under the Interstate Succession Act, any recovery obtained
in the action escheats to the University of North Carolina just as any other
unclaimed property held by executors and administrators of intestates.
Warner v. Western N.C.R.R., 94 N.C. 250 (1886).
'. See, e.g., The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947); Danis
v. New York Cent. R.R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954). But see
Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949) (right of action does
not survive to heirs of beneficiary).
."'Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937); McStay v.
Przychocki, 7 N.J. 456, 81 A.2d 761 (1951).
... See, e.g., Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Oregon.
144 Wettach, Wrongfid Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N.C.L.
REv. 211, 212 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Wettach].
... Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
... See generally Wettach.
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ished. 147 The Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Jones Act, the
Death on the High Seas Act and an amendment to Lord Campbell's
Act' 48 expressly provide that contributory negligence of the decedent
will not bar recovery, but that the damages will be diminished in
proportion to the decedent's fault.
There is also the question of contributory negligence of a bene-
ficiary of the damages in a wrongful death suit. The majority
provide that the action for damages may be allowed, but the recovery
is reduced by the amount of the contributorily negligent bene-
ficiary's share.1 49  It follows that if the contributorily negligent
beneficiary is the sole beneficiary, no action is allowed.'50 A minor-
ity of courts dogmatically hold that contributory negligence is not
relevant,' " ' or that it bars all recovery under the statute.,
2
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS
A. Limitations On Amount of Recovery
Limitations on the amount that can be recovered under wrongful
death statutes are fixed in thirteen states. 53 Colorado provides the
... See Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388
(1925); Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 152 Neb. 39, 40 N.W.2d 252
(1949), aff'd 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609 (1950); Friese v. Gulbrandson,
69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943).
"' 8 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo.
6, c. 28, § 1.
1,0 Wettach 227. See, e.g., Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536,
295 P.2d 972 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (children sued step-father for mother's
death in automobile accident); In re Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807
(1958) (mother killed in car driven by her son).
A father's contributory negligence will not prevent him from suing as
administrator for the death of his son although it will bar him from any
share of the recovery. Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115, 48 S.E. 591 (1904).
,Wettach 225. When damages are reduced or the entire action barred
in North Carolina by the contributory negligence of a beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries, why not award this forbidden recovery to the University of North
Carolina as is done when there are no surviving distributees rather than
allowing the defendant to benefit? See note 140 supra.
1 01Wettach 220.
Wettach 224.
. Colorado, $10,000 maximum ($3,000 minimum when killed as passenger
on a common carrier); lllinois, $30,000 maximum; Kansas, $25,000 maxi-
mum; Maine, $30,000 maximum; Massachusetts, $30,000 maximum-$3,000
minimum ($4,000 maximum if death caused by a defective way); Minnesota,
$25,000 maximum; Missouri, $25,000 maximum; New Hampshire, $20,000
maximum ($40,000 maximum if decedent left a spouse, child or dependent
parent surviving); Oregon, $25,000 maximum; South Dakota, $20,000 maxi-
mum; Virginia, $35,000 maximum; West Virginia, $10,000 maximum with-
out proof of pecuniary loss-$100,000 maximum with proof of loss re-
quired beyond $10,000. Wisconsin, $22,500 maximum recovery for pecuniary
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lowest maximum recovery with a limit of 10,000 dollars, while
100,000 dollars is the limit in West Virginia. Rhode Island provides
a minimum recovery of 5,000 dollars in wrongful death actions.
Difficulty of ascertainment of the damages with the consequent
chance of excessive verdicts is the only practical reason for a statute
to contain a limitation on recovery,'54 and this is not sufficient justi-
fication. Personal injury actions often present equally difficult prob-
lems of computation, but no statutory limits are placed on these
actions. Excessive verdicts are the responsibility of the judge or
appellate court.
B. Limitation of Actions
The great majority of the states, 5 the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the Jones Act, and Lord Campbell's Act start the
statute of limitations running with the death of the decedent. A few
jurisdictions, however, begin the running of the statute with the
act of negligence of the defendant."" Connecticut uses a combina-
tion statute.157 The average length of the statutes of limitations
for wrongful death actions is 2.1 years.' This time would seem
sufficient for bringing an action if the statute of limitations begins
to run at death. Once death has occurred, there is no chance of
further unknown injury arising as in the case of a personal injury.
Logically, the statute of limitations should start to run at the time
injury. $3,000 maximum for loss of society and companionship to spouse,
unemancipated or dependent child or parents. If the decedent leaves depen-
dent children under eighteen years of age, the maximum limit for pecuniary
loss is increased $2,000 for each child, but not to exceed a total increase of
$10,000. The Warsaw Convention has a limit of 125,000 francs. See note
6 supra.
.' Cf. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931)
(elements of damage withheld from jury because of a lack of limit on
recovery).
...See, e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming.
.5 See, e.g., Colorado, Minnesota.
'" A one-year limitation is provided from date the injury is first sustained
or discovered, or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable
care, but no action may be brought more than three years from the date
of the act or omission of the defendant.
1. The North Carolina limitation for a wrongful death action begins to
run from the accrual of the action, i.e., the time of death. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-15 (1953). Causey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 166 N.C. 5, 81 S.E. 917
(1914). The action must be brought within two years from the time the
cause of action accrues. N.C. GEx. STAT. § 1-53(4) (1953).
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of the decedent's death since the decedent may live for a consider-
able time after being injured. Otherwise, the effect is that the
statute of limitations for a wrongful death action would have been
running while the decedent was still alive, although the action itself
could not be brought until the decedent died.
C. Special Provisions
Almost half of the jurisdictions include special provisions in
their wrongful death acts. These deal generally with problems or
situations of particular interest in the jurisdiction.'59 Comparative
negligence and compromise or settlement sections help to facilitate
just and speedy disposition of the cases.' " ' Holding the county
liable for a death by lynching has the obvious purpose of preventing
homicides. 6' Common carriers are treated separately in some
statutes and are often protected by recovery limitations. 6 2 The
"guest statute" provides special limitations on liability for death as
well as personal injury. 63 England has enacted an Air Carriage
Act to supplement Lord Campbell's Act in cases of air disasters.
1'
Some of the statutes expressly provide an action for the death of,
or recovery by, illegitimate or adopted children.'6 5 This specifica-
tion is to make definite any ambiguity or close any gaps in the state
laws on the rights and status of illegitimates and adopteds.' 66
"' See, e.g., Florida (ships and boats); Massachusetts (defective way);
Mississippi (consumption commodities); Nebraska (published notice of dis-
tribution); Texas (steamboats and stagecoaches); Virginia (ships or ves-
sels) ; Death on the High Seas Act (right of action under laws of foreign
countries) ; Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Jones Act (carriers in
territories outside the United States).
100 See, e.g., Arkansas, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, West
Virginia.
101 South Carolina.
102 See, e.g., Colorado, New Mexico.
101 Virginia includes a "guest statute" in its wrongful death act whereby
gross negligence or wanton conduct is necessary in order to recover for the
death of a guest passenger in a motor vehicle.
"'The Carriage By Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1(4). This
statute is similar in content and effect to the provisions of the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000. See note 6 supra.
10. See, e.g., California (illegitimate); Illinois (adopted); Louisiana
(adopted) ; Mississippi (adopted and illegitimate); Missouri (adopted);
South Carolina (illegitimate); Maryland (illegitimate).
10 The North Carolina wrongful death statute does not make any ex-
press provision concerning adopteds or illegitimates, but the intestate succes-
sion law under which recovery of any death damages is distributed stipulates





The statutory direction for damages in wrongful death in North
Carolina is that "the plaintiff in such action167 may recover such
damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
injury resulting from such death."' 68 The North Carolina court
has been strict in interpreting the entire statute,'6 9 and it would
seem to be well settled that the measure of damages is the present
net worth of the decedent to his estate. 70 However, there are some
inconsistencies in the decisions. A change is also apparently develop-
ing concerning the elements of damage to be considered, which
leaves room for doubt as to the exact state of the law in particular
areas.
The first case to construe the North Carolina statute was Collier
v. Arrington,'7' which referred to the measure of damages as the
amount "the plaintiff lost by the death of the person injured."' 72
In Kesler v. Smith, 7 3 the court stated:
The English statute (9-10 Vic., Ch. 93) is substantially the same
as ours . .. [T]he rule of damages which the courts have laid
down is "the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from
the continuance of the life of the deceased." . . . .To bring this
case under the rule the principal inquiry is, "what was the reason-
able expectation of pecuniary advantage to the family of the de-
ceased from the continuance of his life?"
7 4
These statements seem to refer to the measure of damages as loss
to the beneficiaries rather than as loss to the estate of the deceased,
the generally accepted North Carolina rule. This latter rule was
fully stated by the court in Mendenhall v. North Carolina R.R.'7 5
in 1898:
.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965).... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1949).
"'As the right to maintain an action for wrongful death is wholly
statutory, the action must be brought in conformity therewith. See It re
Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958); Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Webb v. Eggleston, 228
N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948); Monfils v. Hazelwood, 218 N.C. 215, 10
S.E.2d 673 (1940); Craig v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 189 N.C. 137, 126 S.E.
312 (1925).
", Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North
Carolina, 31 N.C.L. REv. 249, 259 (1953).1'161 N.C. 356 (1867).
1"2 Id. at 358.
1" 66 N.C. 154 (1872).
117 Id. at 157.
-1.7123 N.C. 275, 31 S.E. 480 (1898).
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The measure of damages is the present value of the net
pecuniary worth of the deceased to be ascertained by deducting
the cost of his living and expenditures from the gross income,
based upon his life expectancy. As a basis on which to enable the
jury to make their estimate, it is competent to show, and for
them to consider the age of the deceased, his prospects in life,
his habits, his character, his industry and skill, the means he
had for making money, the business in which he was employed-
the end of it all being to enable the jury to fix upon the net in-
come which might reasonably be expected if death had not en-
sued .... 176
However, in 1949, the court in Hanks v. Norfolk & W.R.R.'
talked of the "pecuniary worth of the deceased to his family," '
before it went on to state that evidence of the deceased's improvident
attitude toward his family should have been admitted for the jury's
consideration. The court said: "The evidence was admissible as
bearing upon the moral fiber of the deceased and as tending to show
what manner of man he was, especially in providing for those of
his own household who were dependent upon him."17' 9 The court
apparently extended Hicks v. Love.8 to include evidence of the
decedent's attitude. If the court had been using a strict loss-to-
estate measure of damages here, it would not have been material
whether the deceased had a provident attitude toward his family;
only his earning capacity and personal expenditures would have been
170 Id. at 278, 31 S.E. at 480. In Carter v. North Carolina R.R., 139
N.C. 499, 52 S.E. 642 (1905), the court stated: "[The] rule requires the
jury to deduct only the reasonably necessary personal expenses of the de-
ceased, taking into consideration his age, manner of living, business calling
or profession, etc." Id. at 501, 52 S.E. at 643. In McLamb v. Wilmington &
W.R.R., 122 N.C. 862, 29 S.E. 894 (1898), the court upheld an instruction
to the jury that the amount deductible from the decedent's gross income
was his "cost of living and expenditures." Id. at 867, 29 S.E. at 896. What
are reasonably necessary personal expenditures? Apparently a man's income
determines what is reasonably necessary for him, but would this include
any lavish expenditures of an extremely wealthy decedent?
7" 230 N.C. 179, 52 S.E.2d 717 (1949).
8 Id. at 182, 52 S.E.2d at 719.
9 Id. at 183, 53 S.E.2d at 720.
..0 201 N.C. 773, 161 S.E. 394 (1931) (size of decedent's farm, facts of a
comfortable home, plenty for family to eat and wear were held admissible).
Ervin, J., dissenting in Hanks v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 230 N.C. 179, 188, 52
SE.2d 717, 723 (1949), stated the rule as the court had stated it previously.
[Tihe measure of damages for wrongful death is the present worth
of the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased to be ascertained
by deducting the probable costs of his own living and usual and ordi-
nary expenses from the probable gross income derived from his own
exertions based upon his life expectancy.
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at issue. The character evidence admitted in other North Carolina
cases has been ostensibly for the purpose of aiding the jury in
determining the gross income and expenditures of the deceased.",-
The relevance in this case of the father's lack of a provident attitude
would seem to indicate that the court slipped from the loss-to-estate
rule that it had previously applied.182 The Hanks decision has not
been expressly overruled or modified by any subsequent decision,
but Journigan v. Little River Ice Co.183 in 1951 stated the measure
of damages to be the "present worth of the net pecuniary value of
the life of the deceased."' 4 All cases since have adhered to this mea-
sure.
1 8 5
At least nine North Carolina cases have held that the pecuniary
value of the life of the decedent is the net income that the decedent
might have been expected to earn from his own labor or exertion
during his expectancy.' 8 The court, in 1960, held that a pension
the deceased had been receiving for life when he was killed was a
proper element for the jury to consider in determining the net
pecuniary worth of the deceased.'8 7 The court stated, "[W]e do
not understand that the general rule in this respect would exclude
the inclusion of income from an annuity, life estate, retirement
pay, or other income for life only, in arriving at the pecuniary loss
... See, e.g., Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E.2d 341
(1940); Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E.
400 (1926); Purnell v. Rockingham R.R., 190 N.C. 573, 130 S.E. 313
(1925).
18228 N.C.L. REv. 106 (1949).
183233 N.C. 180, 63 S.E.2d 183 (1951).
"'Id. at 184, 63 S.E.2d at 186 (citing Carpenter v. Asheville Power &
Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926); Gurley v. Southern Power
Co., 172 N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916)).
18 See, e.g., Sanders v. George, 258 N.C. 776, 129 S.E.2d 480 (1963).
The court held that the admission of testimony of the bad and questionable
conduct of the intestates carried the jury too far from the critical question
of the fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from
death. Caudle v. Southern R.R., 242 N.C. 466, 88 S.E.2d 138 (1955);
Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
.. Caudle v. Southern R.R., 242 N.C. 466, 88 S.E.2d 138 (1955); Lamm
v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952); Journigan v. Little River
Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 63 S.E.2d 183 (1951) ; Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee,
218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E.2d 341 (1940); White v. North Carolina R.R., 216
N.C. 79, 3 S.E.2d 310 (1939); Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co.,
191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400 (1926); Purnell v. Rockingham R.R., 190 N.C.
573, 130 S.E. 313 (1925); Poe v. Raleigh & Augusta Air Line R.R., 141
N.C. 525, 54 S.E. 406 (1906); Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C.
961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900)."" Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
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sustained by reason of the wrongful death."18 The court did not
indicate expressly or impliedly that these life incomes must be the
result in any manner of the labor of the decedent. Since the defen-
dant challenged the trial court on the admission in evidence of the
pension, 80 it would seem that if the court required the life income
to have been gained through the exertions of the decedent, even
indirectly, it would have stated as much. Apparently the North
Carolina court will now allow the jury to consider any income for
life only as a legitimate element of damage, even though obtained
by the decedent as a gift or devise.' 90 The jury presumably can
look at social security payments and even welfare benefits that the
decedent had been receiving in fixing the damages.
The North Carolina loss-to-estate measure of damages is in the
small minority' and has the definite potential of permitting in-
equitable results in certain situations.
The court has stated that the North Carolina wrongful death
statute was modeled after Lord Campbell's Act and that it has been
interpreted on some points in the same way as the English courts
have interpreted the English statute.'9 2 However, the similarity be-
tween the North Carolina statute and Lord Campbell's Act and the
majority of other wrongful death acts' 9 3 is in substance slight. The
latter measure damages by the loss suffered by the beneficiaries as
a result of the wrongful death,' while North Carolina and a few
other jurisdictions apply the loss-to-estate, or the worth-of-de-
ceased's-life, measure.'9 5 Also, North Carolina allows recovery only
for loss of financial contributions,' whereas the English statute
and the majority of other jurisdictions using the loss-to-beneficiaries
measure allow recovery for services that the deceased rendered
gratuitously but that would have required payment to third persons
1. Id. at 494, 114 S.E.2d at 246.
10o Id. at 493, 114 S.E.2d at 245.
100 The court stated: "It is not intended that this opinion shall alter,
modify or overrule any of our previous opinions dealing with the measure
of damages for wrongful death." Id. at 498, 114 S.E.2d at 248. But see
notes 186 & 188 supra.
101 See note 195 infra.
102 Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
10" See notes 17 & 18 supra. See Cobia v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
188 N.C. 487, 125 S.E. 18 (1924) (comparing the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and the North Carolina measures).° See note 28 supra.
100 See note 52 szpra.
10 See notes 59 & 61 supra.
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to replace. 1 7 A substantial number of jurisdictions allow other
damages in addition to those for pecuniary loss of contributions
and services.
9 8
The loss-to-estate-of-deceased, or net-pecuniary-worth-of-dece-
dent's-life, -measure of damages is an unreasonable burden to place
upon a jury. Consideration is given to the decedent's health, habits,
age, earning capacity, and employment (provided he was old enough
to exhibit these factors)."" However, asking a jury to look into
the future on the basis of these considerations and reasonably pre-
dict the gross earnings of the decedent, and the probable amount of
his personal expenditures, 0 0 is something that cannot be done with
any hope of accuracy. When the death is that of a child, the jury
must make an even more speculative determination than in the case
of an adult since the child has a longer life expectancy and there
is no history of earning power. Often the evidence is limited to
sex, age, health and appearance.20 ' The loss-to-beneficiaries mea-
sure of damages reduces the burden on the jury by requiring that
only a beneficiary's reasonably expected pecuniary benefit or ad-
vantage be determined. 0 2 If there is no benefit to be reasonably
expected, and resort must be had to speculation or conjecture to
determine damages, there is no recovery. 0 3 The jury is not asked
19. See notes 32-36, 41, 47 supra.
... See notes 41 & 47 supra.
19 See, e.g., White v. North Carolina R.R., 216 N.C. 79, 3 S.E.2d 310
(1939); Carter v. North Carolina R.R., 139 N.C. 499, 52 S.E. 642 (1905);
Coley v. City of Statesville, 121 N.C. 301, 28 S.E. 482 (1897).
200 Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172 N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916).
"'See, e.g., Bumgardner v. Allison, 238 N.C. 621, 78 S.E.2d 752 (1953)
($25,000 for a strong, healthy eleven-year-old girl of more than average
ability); Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946) ($15,000
for normal, healthy, unusually attractive nine-year-old girl); Russell v.
Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900) ($1,000 for
five-month-old baby of normal health).
202 See, e.g., Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1964); Boller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 185 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind.
1960); Brabeck v. Chicago & N. Ry., 264 Minn. 160, 117 N.W.2d 921
(1962); Devine v. Southern Pac. Co., 207 Ore. 261, 295 P.2d 201 (1956).
20. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp.
528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 859 (1961); Presley v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 153 So. 2d 416
(La. App. 1963); Bowley v. Smith, 131 Me. 402, 163 Atl. 539 (1932);
Gilman v. G. W. Dart Hardware Co., 42 Mont. 96, 111 Pac. 550 (1910).
A few states presume pecuniary injury because of a wrongful death.
See, e.g., Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942); Shanowat v.
Checker Taxi Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 81, 198 N.E.2d 573 (1964); Henke
v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1, (N.D. 1958); Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C. 364,
120 S.E.2d 209 (1961); Beaman v. Martha Washington Mining Co., 23
Utah 139, 63 Pac. 631 (1901).
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to determine lifetime income, but only what benefits the beneficiary
can prove that he lost as a result of the death.20 4 Evidence of the
amount of damage to the beneficiary can thus be admitted on two
sides of the issue in the loss-to-beneficiaries measure: (1) earning
capacity, occupation, age, habits, etc., including value of services
(in all but two jurisdictions using this measure) ; and (2) evidence
of the amount of money and the value of services the beneficiary
would have a reasonable expectancy of receiving.
The inequities of the loss-to-estate measure of damages 2 5 are
apparent in Lamm v. Lorbacher2°0 where the life of a thirty-three-
year-old wife and mother of two children was found to be worth
4,000 dollars. The court stated:
[T]his court has uniformly held, in view of this restrictive lan-
guage (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-173), that the consideration of the
jury should be confined to determining the amount of money the
decedent would have earned . . . to ascertain . . .the pecuniary
value of the life of the decedent to his estate.207
This rules out any recovery for the value of the services the dece-
dent rendered gratuitously as a housewife and mother. The court
in Bradley v. Ohio River & C.R.R.. -° in 1898, stated that the
"value of the labor" 20 of the deceased should be taken into account
in determining damages, but the court in ruling on the issue of
damages in Lamin expressly stated that this language was not in-
tended to extend the damages to include recovery for uncompensated
services.21° This measure of damages results in the finding that the
life of the wife and mother in Lamm is worth only sixteen per
cent as much in death damages as the life of the sixteen-year-old
girl whose estate recovered 25,000 dollars in Bumgardner v. Alli-
solt.2 1  This result obviously was reached by the jury because the
wife and mother was saddled with gratuitous homemaking services
and had little prospect of taking a wage-paying job because of her
responsibilities to her family. The decedent in Bumgardner, who
... Szofran v. Century Elec. Co., 255 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. App. 1953).
205 The result would be the same in Colorado and Maine which use loss
to beneficiaries, but do not allow recovery for loss of services. See generally
cases cited note 30 supra.
206 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
20 7 Id. at 731, 71 S.E.2d at 52.
20. 122 N.C. 972, 30 S.E. 8 (1898).
... Id. at 973, 30 S.E. at 8.
2" 235 N.C. 728, 731, 71 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1952).
"'2 238 N,C. 621, 78 S,E,2d 752 (1953).
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had never been a wage earner and hence was untested as such
(though the jury must have found as fact her future earnings),
had no responsibilities that precluded speculation of her lifetime
earning capacity.
212
Without question, the loss resulting from the death of a wife
and mother can be much greater in actual financial injury than the
loss incurred by the destruction of a working woman's earning
power. Few women earn salaries of sufficient size to enable them
to purchase the twenty-four-hour, seven-day-a-week services that a
woman bestows upon her family.2 13 It is also important to remem-
ber that the services of a wife and mother, because of her care in
performing these services resulting from natural affection, are
worth more than the mere labor itself.2 14 It is patently unjust to
212 There was no evidence that the wife and mother in Lamm v. Lorbacher
ever could have reasonably expected to earn wages because of the responsi-
bilities of her domestic duties. It would seem that the $4,000 award was
based more on sympathy than the rule as stated by the cases cited in Lamm.
See Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400
(1926) ; Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172 N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916).
.In Weiss v. Rubin, 11 App. Div. 2d 818, 205 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1960),
a malpractice action for the wrongful death of a twenty-five-year-old mother
of two children resulting from an incompatible blood transfusion, the jury
awarded $130,000 for the negligent death. The plaintiff used the testimony
of an expert from the Yonkers Family Service Society who itemized the
cost of replacing the decedent's motherly duties.
Wages for substitute mother (combination nurse-governess):
$80 a week for first 5 years ........................ $ 20,800.00
$75 a week for the next 15 years .................. 58,500.00
Wages for part-time housekeeper, $1.50 an hour,
16 hours a week for 20 years ...................... 24,960.00
Wages for baby sitter, $1.00 an hour, 6 hours
a week (48 weeks a year) for 5 years .............. 1,440.00
Social Security for 3 employees (substitute
mother, housekeeper, and baby sitter) .............. 4,149.12
Workmen's Compensation insurance for 3 employees ..... 1,500.00
Liability insurance ................................... 240.00
Advertising for, interviewing and screening
applicants for substitute mother .................... 1,200.00
Agency supervision and training of
substitute mother ................................. 1,980.00
Family counseling and psychological guidance
for father ........................................ 5,000.00
TOTAL for 20-year period .............. $119,769.12
This verdict was affirmed in Weiss v. Rubin, 9 N.Y.2d 230, 213 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1961), with a reduction of the judgment to $90,000."21 Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958). In Continental Bus
Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), the court
stated:
In computing the damages of a husband for the death of his wife,
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tell a husband and his children that they are entitled to no recovery
because the wife and mother was too burdened with the responsi-
bility of caring for them and the home to have the probability of
becoming a wage earner, which would enable recovery of damages
for her death.
The loss-to-beneficiaries measure of damages would help relieve
situations where no recovery can now be given in North Carolina
for the death of the handicapped or elderly who have no prospect
of earning wages.2 18 These persons may have a definite pecuniary
value to their beneficiaries because of benefit from gratuitous ser-
vices that is completely overlooked by the current "monetary con-
tribution only" approach in North Carolina.218
The North Carolina wrongful death statute provides that the
recovery obtained in the action be distributed according to the Intes-
tate Succession Act. 17 The beneficiaries take statutorily prescribed
shares with no regard for the injury that may have been caused to
them individually by the death of the decedent.21 8 It is possible that
a spouse or child who was completely independent from, and even
hostile to, the decedent before he was killed, may take a lion's share
of the recovery, while a totally dependent child, grandchild, parent
or grandparent receives a lesser portion, or nothing.219 The depen-
the recovery should not be limited to the recovery of the cost of a
menial servant. Neither should the recovery be limited to what the
wife would have earned working for another, nor to a combination
thereof. Rather would these be included along with the recovery for
the value of her services in counseling, advising, inspiring, comforting
and otherwise serving her husband as would have reasonably been
expected from a wife who was the kind of person she is shown to
have been.
Id. at 167.
... See, e.g., Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965);
Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1959). See note
82 supra.
... See cases cited note 215 supra. Contra, Hepp. v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240,
130 P.2d 859 (1942). The court awarded $10,000 to the husband of the
decedent who had been so crippled for twenty-five years before her death
that she could not work, walk or dress herself. Although the jury was
allowed to consider loss of society, companionship, comfort and protection,
damages were also based on the decedent's guidance, advice and intellectual
training.21 7N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1965).
218 See Harrison v. Carter, 226 N.C. 36, 36 S.E.2d 700 (1946).
The Intestate Succession Act provides a rigid statutory scheme for
distribution with no regard to any consideration other than the legal rela-
tionship of the parties involved. See statute cited note 217 supra. See Avery
v. Brantley, 191 N.C. 396, 131 SE. 721 (1926); 5 N.C.L. REv. 72 (1926).
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dent nonrelative gets no compensation at all, even when there are
no relatives.220 These are obvious inequities, for the purpose of the
wrongful death statutes, with few exceptions, is to compensate the
relatives or dependents of the decedent for their loss,221 not to pro-
vide a windfall for a person in the chain of intestate succession
who may have suffered no loss at all because of the death.
It is not logical, even if it were possible, to compensate the
deceased for losses that he never incurred. The injuries the decedent
suffered prior to death are recoverable under the survival statute.
22
Damages under a wrongful death statute are indisputably for the
loss sustained by the beneficiaries. Compensation should be com-
puted on the basis of actual loss to those suffering injury because
of the death. Why measure damages by loss to the estate of the
deceased? The damages were not sustained by the deceased and
cannot be compensatory to anyone for the death itself. The loss
suffered by the beneficiaries should measure the recovery and its
distribution. Otherwise, the result is analogous to dressing the bene-
ficiaries in a suit of mourning clothes that was tailored for the
deceased, and tailored badly at that.
J. TROY SMITH, JR.
APPENDIX A
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1960).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.340 (1962).
Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-611 to -613 (1956).
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN.. §§ 27-906 to -910 (1962).
California: CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 376-77.
Colorado: CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1-1 to -4 (1953).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (1958).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1953).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01-.04 (1964).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 1054301 to -1305, -1307 to -1310
(1956), -1306 (Supp. 1963).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. LAWS § 246-2 (1955).
220 Only relatives are provided for under the Intestate Succession Act.
See notes 140 & 217 supra.221 See Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947) (bene-
ficiary, not the administrator, is the real party in interest).
. See note 9 supra.
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Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-310 to -311 (1948).
Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1 (1959), 2 (Supp. 1964).
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (Supp. 1965).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (1964).
Kansas: KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1901 to -1905 (1964).
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.130[6] (1962).
Louisiana: LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1964).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2551-53 (1964).
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, §§ 1, 2, 6 (1957), 4 (Supp.
1965).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, §§ 2B, 6C-6D
(1955), 1-2, 2B, 5A-6B, 6D, 6F, 11 (Supp. 1964).
Michigan: MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (1962).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (Supp. 1964).
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 1454 (1956), 1453 (Supp. 1964).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.080-.090 (Supp. 1964).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-2809 to -2810 (1964).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-809 to -810 (1956).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 12.080-.090 (1960).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 556.12, :14 (1955),
.13 (Supp. 1963).
New Jersey: N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:31-1 to -3, -5 to -6 (1952),
-4 (Supp. 1965).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-20-1, -3 (1954), -2, -4
(Supp. 1965).
New York: N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW §§ 130-34.
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-174 (1949), -173 (Supp.
1965).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-21-01 to -06 (1960).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01-.04 (1954).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1053-54 (1961).
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.010-.100 (1961).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-04 (1953).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-7-1, -3 to -9 (1956),
-2 (Supp. 1964).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1956, -1961
(1962).
South Dakota: S.D. CODE §§ 37.2201-.2204 (Supp. 1960).
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Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-608 to -614 (1955), -607
(Supp. 1965).
Texas: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-78 (1952).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to -7 (1953), -12 (Supp.
1965).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1491 (1958), 1492 (Supp.
1965).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-635, -637 to -638, -740 to -641,
-646.1 (1957), -633 to -634, -636, -639 (Supp. 1964).
Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.20.005-.030, .046-.050,
.010 (1962).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5474, 5476 (1961), 5475
(Supp. 1965).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 331.03-.031, .045 (1958), .04
(Supp. 1965).
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1065 to -1066 (1959).
Federal Employers' Liability Act: 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended,
53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
Jones Act: 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 Stat. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act: 41 Stat. 537 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
Lord Campbell's Act: The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict.,
c. 93, §§ 1-6, as amended, The Fatal Accidents Act, 1864, 27 &
28 Vict., c. 95 §§ 1-3; The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Pro-
visions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 2; The Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28, §§
1-7; The Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c.) Act, 1954,
2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 36, § 3; The Fatal Accidents Act, 1959, 7 & 8
Eliz. 2, c. 65, §§ 1-2.
These fifty-four statutes are the source of the statistics used in this
article.
APPENDIX B
PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
(1) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, such as would, if the injured party
had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the
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person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or
their executors, administrators, collectors or successors shall be liable
to an action for damages, to be brought by the executor, admin-
istrator or collector of the decedent; and this notwithstanding the
death, and although the wrongful act, neglect or default, causing the
death, amounts in law to a felony.
Comment: The first section is similar to the present North Caro-
lina wrongful death statute and leaves intact the law as to con-
tributory negligence of the decedent, the right of the executor,
administrator or collector alone to bring the action, and the fact
that the action is not affected because the death is the result of
a criminal act.
(2) The recovery obtained by an action under this statute shall
not be subject to the debts of the estate of the deceased, but is for
the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries hereinafter named.
(3) Damages may be given to compensate the surviving spouse,
children, parents and any whole or partial dependent of the de-
ceased. Recovery shall be for the loss of any pecuniary benefit or
advantage reasonably to have been expected from the continuance
of the life of the deceased. The fact of kinship shall not give rise
to any presumption of pecuniary loss.
Comment: This is contrary to the present North Carolina rule
that measures damages by the loss to the estate of the deceased.
The damages here are based on the injury actually resulting from
the death. Recovery is not limited to any class of beneficiaries,
but is extended to include any persons wholly or partially depen-
dent upon the decedent, whether legally related or not.
(4) Damages are limited to the pecuniary loss to the bene-
ficiaries qualifying under § 3. as a result of- the wrongful death.
Pecuniary loss is the reasonably expectable receipt, if the decedent
had lived, of
a. monetary contributions, and
b. gratuitous services having a pecuniary value.
(5) The jury, or the judge if there is no jury, shall distribute
the damages according to the proved losses, as defined by § 4, of
each beneficiary.
(6) There shall be no recovery for the funeral expenses of the
deceased unless this results in a pecuniary loss to a beneficiary. Any
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recovery under this section is limited to One Thousand dollars
($1,000).
Comment: Although death is inevitable, the beneficiary who pays
for the funeral when the decedent is wrongfully killed might not
be the one who would have to bear the cost if the decedent lives
out his expectancy. Recovery is limited in order to maintain rea-
sonable expenses for the burial of a decedent.
(7) If any beneficiary qualifying under § 3 dies before judgment
is rendered in an action under § 1, the beneficiary's estate shall re-
cover such damages as defined by § 4 as the beneficiary suffered
from the time of the wrongful death of the decedent until his own
death.
Comment: The effect of this section is to change the North Caro-
lina law so as to abate the action upon the death of the sole
surviving beneficiary except for recovery of damages that he ac-
tually suffered before death. The award is not taken by the
University of North Carolina by escheat because the defendant
should only be required to compensate injuries his action caused.
The University of North Carolina suffers no injury as a result
of the wrongful death.
(8) If there are no survivors qualifying under § 3, no recovery
shall be allowed under this statute unless the estate of the decedent
is insolvent. If the estate is insolvent, the recovery shall be limited
to reasonable burial and estate administration expenses not exceed-
ing Fifteen Hundred dollars ($1,500).
Comment: This section prevents any judgment against a defen-
dant where there are no injured parties to suffer damage because
of the death. It also prevents the state from having to pay the
expenses of administration and decedent's burial.
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